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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * • * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH, ) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CAMMACK 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) 
: Criminal Case No. 011500845 
vs. ) 
: Appellant Case No. 20030122-CA 
DEWEY BUD CAMMACK, ) 
Defendant/Appellant. ) Argument Priority: (15) 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter in that it is an appeal 
l n a criminal case not involving a first degree or capital felony. I Hah Code 
Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953, as amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for appeal in this case by Appellant are as follows: 
I8SUI NO 1 Whethn <u nol Wivtv w,»s sufficient evidence to convict the 
Appellant of the lessor included offense of Count I, theft, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended'-' 
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to convict the 
Appellant of Count II, forgery, a third degree felony, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 
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6, Section 501, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended? 
ISSUE NO. 3: Whether or not the trial court erred in either overruling 
Appellant's specific objection to irrelevant or prejudicial testimony or not adequately 
instructing the jury? 
ISSUE NO. 4: Whether or not the trial court erred in denying the Appellant's 
motion to continue preliminary hearing to obtain counsel and whether or not 
objection by the county attorney's office to Appellant's motion for continuance or 
alternatively loose and prejudicial characterization of evidence at trial constituted 
prosecutorial misconduct? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for a claim of sufficiency of evidence is to view the 
evidence and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from it in a light most 
favorable to the jury verdict. State v. Caver. 814 P.2d 604 (Utah App. 1991); see 
also State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342, 345 (1985). A jury verdict will be reversed only 
if the evidence is "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable" that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime of which he was convicted. Id. at 612. 
In a prosecution for theft involving assignment of a real estate sales contract, 
the State must prove more than merely breach of contract but that the defendant 
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exercised "unauthorized control" over the property of another for the purpose of 
depriving, meaning to withhold property permanently or for so extended a period of 
use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its economic value or use 
compensation; or dispose of the property under circumstances that make it unlikely 
the owner will recover, see State v. Burton, 800 P.2d 817 (Utah App. 1990). 
In a prosecution ol lonjeiy Ihe State imisl [iiove Ihe defendant possessed 
specific intent to defraud "anyone"; however, the act of signing another's name 
without permission does not constitute "forgery" unless it is done with intent to 
defraud. To sustain a conviction for forgery, there must be a sufficient connection 
between the act of forgery and the intent to defraud. Moreover, even if a defendant 
possesses intent to defraud and commits the act of signing another's name without 
authority, the forgery cannot be sustained unless the act was done in the furtherance 
<rl IIIHI IIIIHIIIIMI llnih .1 \lefendant who li;is signed another's nanu without 
permission, while possessing an intent to defraud that is completely unrelated to the 
unauthorized signing, has not committed forgery. State v. Winward, 909 P.2d 909, 
UK1 muii ih Ann l!K)b> 
For testimony to be relevant at trial, it must have a tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is a consequence to the determination of the action more 
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probable or less probable than it would be without such evidence. See Rule 401, 
Utah Rules of Evidence. Balancing the probative value of evidence against the 
prejudicial effect it may have on the jury necessarily rests within the sound discretion 
of the trial court and the determination it makes thereon should not be disturbed on 
appeal unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. See State v. Gibson. 565 P.2d 
783 (Utah 1977); See also State v. Pierre. 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977), cert, denied, 
439 U.S. 882, 99 S.Ct. 219, 58 L.Ed.2d 194 (1978). To constitute an abuse of 
discretion the error must have been harmful. See State v. Larsen. 775 P.2d 415, 
419 (Utah 1989). Testimony leading to evidence of prior convictions in addition to 
having probative value that outweighs its prejudicial effect under Rule 403, Utah 
Rules of Evidence, must comply with the requirements of Rule 404, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, in that it is only admissible if offered as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or the absence of mistake or accident and 
provided that upon the request by the accused that the prosecution in a criminal case 
provide reasonable notice in advance of trial or during trial if the court excuses 
pretrial notice on good cause shown of the nature of any such evidence. 
The prosecution has responsibility to administer justice to see that the 
defendant is accorded procedural justice and to see that guilt is decided upon the 
basis of sufficient evidence, see State v. Hay. 859 P.2d 1 (Utah 1993); see also 
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State v. Jarrell. 608 P.2d 218 (Utah 1980). The prosecutor in a criminal case shall 
make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of his right to, 
and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity 
to obtain counsel. See Rule 3.8(b) Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The Appellant is aware of no statutory provisions that is dispositive to but 
believes the following apply. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953, as amended) 
Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 404, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 3.8(b) Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE of the CASE: This is a criminal case where the Appellant was 
charged with theft, a second degree felony, and forgery, a third degree felony, 
involving the alteration of a real estate contract which was used as the subject of an 
assignment of contract (collateral assignment) that served as collateral for a loan or 
investment where the Appellant received eight thousand five hundred dollars 
($8,500.00) in exchange for a promise to pay nine thousand three hundred fifty 
dollars ($9,350.00) in approximately sixty (60) days. The copy of the real estate 
sales contract given to the assignee as collateral was not the one signed by the 
purchasers of the property and reflected alterations made by the Appellant. When 
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the assignee discovered that the contract he received was not the same as that 
which was signed by the purchasers of the property, the assignee confronted the 
Appellant who offered to exchange the altered contract with the original that had 
been signed by the purchasers of the property but the assignee refused. Through 
the purchase of the real estate sales contract by a third party, the assignee was paid 
in excess of the amount set forth in the assignment, over eleven thousand dollars 
($11,000.00). Notwithstanding, the charges of theft and forgery were pursued. A 
preliminary hearing was conducted while Appellant was not represented by counsel 
although Appellant had requested a continuance to obtain counsel. The State 
objected to the continuance. Counsel was retained by Appellant prior to trial. At 
trial, the jury found the Appellant guilty of theft, a lessor included offense, a third 
degree felony, and forgery, a third degree felony. Instructions given to the jury 
included a portion of the language found to be relevant from State v. Winward, 909 
P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1995) but should have probably included as part of the 
instruction the language regarding sustaining a conviction for forgery. In other 
words, the instruction should have also established the point that a sufficient 
connection between the act of forgery and the intent to defraud or that the 
unauthorized signing of the another's name while possessing an intent to defraud 
unrelated to the unauthorized signing is not sufficient to sustain a conviction. 
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B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION: On or about the 5th 
day of September, 2001, the Appellant was charged with Count I, theft, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, and Count II, forgery, a third degree felony, in violation of Title 
76, Chapter 6, Section 501, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, which 
resulted from circumstances involving a real estate transaction of property in Iron 
County wherein the Appellant sold property to a couple from Las Vegas, Nevada 
(hereinafter the "Granillos"). An exemplary or altered contract was presented to an 
investor, Terry Porter (hereinafter "Porter") as collateral for an assignment of 
contract by the Appellant who as seller and assignor arranged for borrowing of 
money, more or less as an alternative to using a promissory note. As assignee, 
Porter agreed to the arrangement and loaned Appellant eight thousand five hundred 
dollars ($8,500.00). When the collateral was suspected of not being original or valid, 
Appellant offered to exchange for the original and when refused arranged for a sale 
of the contract to 
a third party to pay back the obligation of the assignment. The third party was 
Thomas Comstock (hereinafter "Comstock") of Cedar City, Utah, who ultimately 
purchased the Granillo Contract for a sum in excess of the amount owed to the 
assignee, who instead of receiving nine thousand three hundred fifty dollars 
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($9,350.00), received in excess of eleven thousand dollars ($11,000.00). The 
various transactions were concluded prior to the filing of the charges in September, 
2001. 
On or about the 8th day of November, 2001, the Appellant, acting on behalf of 
himself, requested that the preliminary hearing, set for the 19th day of November, 
2001, be continued to allow him to obtain legal counsel. On or about the 13th day of 
November, 2001, the State filed its objection to Appellant's request and the trial 
court denied it. The preliminary hearing was conducted while the Appellant was not 
represented by counsel. See the record at page 35. 
Thereafter, in March, 2002, Appellant retained the services of Michael D. 
Esplin who entered his appearance and moved to continue the status conference 
and trial. The motion was granted and continued a second time in April, 2002, and 
ultimately set for trial on the 8th day of August, 2002. 
A jury trial was conducted on that date where at some point defense counsel 
objected to a question regarding why Appellant was nervous about bringing the 
matter to the attention of the county attorney's office, in other words inquiring of 
Porter the general state of mind of the Appellant, and the court overruled the 
objection allowing Porter to testify that the Appellant was afraid he would be arrested 
for his conduct in part because of his previous dealings with law enforcement. The 
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court later made a record of its reason for overruling the objection and ultimately 
denied the State's further questions to the Appellant regarding his failure to report 
the real estate transaction where it was a condition of the Appellant's probation 
agreement at the time. The jury instructions submitted included a definitional 
instruction of "purpose to deprive", more or less as found in the case of State v. 
Winward, 909 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1995); however, failed to instruct as to the 
requirement to sustain a conviction for forgery that it be in the furtherance of the 
intention to defraud or in other words that there be a sufficient connection between 
the act of forgery and the intent to defraud. Likewise, the instruction did not further 
advise that possessing an intent to defraud unrelated to an unauthorized signing was 
not sufficient to sustain forgery. The jury instruction was given more or less in the 
form submitted and the Court gave the lessor included instruction on theft submitted 
by defense counsel. The jury returned a verdict on the lessor included offense of 
theft, a third degree felony, and forgery, a third degree felony. A pre-sentence 
investigation report was conducted and the Appellant was later sent to undergo a 
diagnostic evaluation. On or about the 23rd day of January, 2003, a judgment, 
sentence, stay of execution of sentence, order of probation and commitment is 
believed1 to have been filed with the Fifth Judicial District Court requiring Appellant 
1
 Upon receiving the record, counsel for Appellant noticed two irregularities. 
The first is the judgment, sentence, stay of execution of sentence, order of probation 
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to serve one (1) year in the county jail, granted the privilege of work release, make 
substantial payment toward restitution in his previous cases, maintain full time 
employment, and give notice to the Iron County Attorney's Office of any real estate 
deals at least fifteen (15) days prior to the transfer of property. 
C. DISPOSITION OF THE TRIAL COURT: Based upon the jury verdict, the 
Appellant was ultimately sentenced to serve one (1) year in jail with work release 
and other terms and conditions including notification of the Iron County Attorney's 
Office of any pending real estate transfers within fifteen (15) days prior to the transfer 
of property by Appellant and came as a result of the performance of a pre-sentence 
investigative report and a diagnostic evaluation. The judgment, sentence, stay of 
execution of sentence, order of probation and commitment was filed on or about the 
23rd day of January, 2003, although the original appears not to be a matter of record, 
a copy of the same showing the court's filing stamp is attached hereto as Exhibit A, 
and commitment appears to be missing from the record. However, the document was a 
part of the record at the time of the filing of the docketing statement since a copy of the 
same was attached to the docketing statement. A true and correct photocopy of the 
document as was attached to the docketing statement has been attached hereto which 
does not bare the page number in the record but shows the date stamp for filing. 
Second, State's Exhibit 6 is identified in the record collectively with the other trial 
exhibits at page 165 and the transcript at trial at page 124 discusses State's Exhibit 6, 
the assignment of contract, but fails to indicate whether or not the exhibit was received. 
However, the exhibit list reflects State's Exhibit 6 as being received. Counsel is aware 
of no other time in the trial of which a record was made where the exhibit was received 
by stipulation or ruling of the trial court. Counsel is not aware if this exhibit was 
submitted with the other exhibits for consideration by the jury. 
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and a notice of appeal was filed on or about the 11th day of February, 2003. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about the 5th day of November, 2000, the Appellant met with Antonio 
T. Granillo and Remona Granillo (hereinafter "Granillos") of Las Vegas, Nevada and 
showed them a parcel of property approximately 140 acres located in Iron County, 
State of Utah, see trial transcript at pages 174-75. His purpose was to sell the 
property to them. The result was that the Granillos left with Appellant a five hundred 
dollar ($500.00) earnest money deposit and executed a document entitled Statement 
of Buyers' Costs reflecting a purchase price of thirty-five thousand dollars 
($35,000.00) and an additional down payment of five hundred dollars ($500.00) to 
be paid at closing. A true and correct photocopy of the Statement of Buyers' Costs 
is identified in State's Exhibits 1 and 4, collectively made a part of the record at page 
165. 
2. The Appellant prepared a document entitled Uniform Real Estate Contract 
dated the 10th day of November, 2000, acknowledging the down payment of one 
thousand dollars ($1,000.00) and providing for monthly payments of three hundred 
thirty-four dollars and seventy-three cents ($334.73). The same was sent to the 
Granillos and it appears that they signed the contract on or about the 29th day of 
December, 2000. The contract was recorded on or about the 31st day of May, 2001, 
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as Entry Number 434769 in Book 752 at Page 521 to 523 in the official records of 
the Iron County Recorder's Office and a photocopy of the same is attached hereto 
marked as Appellant's Exhibit B, incorporated herein by this reference. 
3. On or about the 11* day of November, 2000, the Appellant prepared a 
second Uniform Real Estate Contract identifying the same parties, dated the 11* day 
of November, 2000, describing the same parcel of property and showing monthly 
payments of three hundred four dollars and ninety cents ($304.90) per month 
continuing until paid in full and reflecting the parties signatures purported to be 
signed on or about the 5th day of November, 2000. The same is identified as State's 
Exhibit 2 collectively a part of the record at page 165 and a photocopy of the same 
is attached hereto marked as Appellant's Exhibit C, incorporated herein by this 
reference. Appellant's testimony at trial was that he had fixed the signatures of the 
buyers to the contract for purposes of using the contract as collateral on a loan. See 
the trial transcript at pages 179-181. 
4. On or about the 21st day of December, 2000, the Appellant executed as 
assignor an agreement entitled Assignment of Contract referring to the document 
identified as State's Exhibit 3 at trial and the same was executed by Porter as 
assignee and was identified as State's Exhibit 6 at trial and a part of the record at 
page 165, the same is incorporated herein by this reference, a true and correct 
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photocopy of the same attached as Appellant's Exhibit D. Although the language of 
the contract is not clear, the testimony of the Appellant and Porter at trial is 
uncontroverted that the assignment of contract was intended to be a collateral 
assignment for security purposes to insure the payment of a debt rather than an 
absolute transfer of interest, see trial transcript at pages 141-143 and 185-186. 
5. Later, Porter discovered that the contract he held was not that which was 
signed by the Granillos and confronted the Appellant. See trial transcript at pages 
134-138. The Appellant offered to substitute the collateral, a remedy provided under 
the terms of the assignment of contract, which Porter refused. 
6. Eventually, a third party, Thomas Comstock, purchased as opposed to 
loaning money as was previously arranged, the Granillo Contract and in doing so the 
Appellant relinquished his interest therein and Porter received fifteen thousand 
dollars ($15,000.00) minus a payoff to a lien holder. See the trial transcript at pages 
95-97. The transfer of interest was made and the matter resolved prior to 
commencement of criminal charges. 
7. In September, 2001, the Appellant was charged with Count I, theft, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, and Count II, forgery, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 501, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
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amended. See the record at page 3. The Appellant made a first appearance in 
October, 2001. See the record at page 15. 
8. Prior to the preliminary hearing set in November, 2001, the Appellant 
requested a continuance to allow him time to secure an attorney of his choice. See 
the record at page 29. The State objected to the continuance see the record at page 
32. 
9. The trial court denied the continuance and required the Appellant to 
represent himself at preliminary hearing on or about the 19th day of November, 2001. 
See the record at page 35. 
10. Appellant retained the services of Michael D. Esplin and the matter was 
eventually set for trial in August, 2002. 
11. At some point during the jury trial defense counsel objected to a question 
regarding why Appellant was nervous about bringing the matter to the attention of 
the county attorney's office or law enforcement. Counsel for the Appellant objected. 
The court overruled the objection and allowed Porter to respond to the question. 
Porter responded that the county attorney's office was out get him or words to that 
effect. See the trial transcript at page 137. The trial court later made a record of its 
ruling, see the trial transcript at pages 155-158 and ultimately would not allow the 
State to question Appellant about his probation agreement to notify the Iron County 
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attorney's office of any pending sales. See the trial transcript at pages 209-214. 
12. The trial court adopted as its own the instruction provided by counsel for 
Appellant and gave as part of the definitional instruction at trial. See the trial 
transcript at page 135 and compare to the record at page 102. However, the 
instructions were not sufficient in instructing on the connection between the act of 
forgery and the intent to defraud. There does not appear to be an instruction given 
regarding any caution of evidence of prior criminal acts. The court adopted the 
instruction submitted counsel for Appellant regarding the lessor included offense of 
theft, a third degree felony. 
13. The jury returned a verdict of guilty to the lessor included offense of theft, 
a third degree felony and returned a plea of guilty on Count II, forgery, a third degree 
felony. 
14. After undergoing a pre-sentence investigation and a diagnostic evaluation, 
the Defendant was sentenced to one (1) year in jail with the privilege of work release 
and requiring standard terms and conditions but including notification to the county 
attorney's office of any pending real estate transfers at least fifteen (15) days prior 
to the transfer. The judgment, sentence, stay of execution of sentence and order of 
probation and commitment was filed on or about the 23rd day of January, 2003, and 
appeal was filed on or about the 11th day of February, 2003. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. 
After marshaling the evidence, there is no reasonable inference that supports 
the jury verdict of theft which as in State v. Burton, 800 P.2d 817 (Utah App. 1990), 
the issue concerns breach of contract involving real estate. There was no 
unauthorized control of the property of another as the Appellant either owned the 
land or acknowledged it as being subject to a contract interest. Whichever form 
taken, the collateral interest is valid and subject to the terms of the assignment of 
contract. The parties received what they bargained for. There was no purpose to 
deprive and there is no loss. 
B. 
After marshaling the evidence, there is no reasonable inference that supports 
the jury verdict of forgery because the State failed to meet the requirements of State 
v. Winward. 909 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1995) in establishing the connection 
necessary to sustain a conviction that the unauthorized signing was made with the 
intent to defraud and in perpetuating the fraud. The contract provided for a 
substitution of collateral which the assignee chose not to utilize in enforcing the 
agreement and eventually he received more than that which he contracted. The 
transaction was concluded to the assignee's satisfaction before criminal charges 
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were filed. 
C. 
The trial court erred in overruling the objection made by defense counsel 
regarding the Appellants concern involving law enforcement because response to 
the question opened the door to prior bad acts and the matter does not appear to 
have been considered in light of the requirements of Rules 401,403 and 404, Utah 
Rules of Evidence. Moreover, the trial court erred in not adequately instructing the 
jury by way of a more complete instruction on forgery in light of State v. Winward, 
advising of the connection needed to sustain a conviction or including a cautionary 
instruction on the consideration of prior bad acts. 
D. 
The trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion to continue preliminary 
hearing to obtain counsel and the county attorney's objection to continuance, 
together with mischaracterization of the evidence at trial constituted prosecutional 
misconduct. The prosecutor has a duty to see that justice is done and to make 
reasonable efforts to insure that a defendant has adequate opportunity to obtain 
counsel to be present at all proceedings. The objection, under the circumstances 
was unnecessary and not consistent with the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Forcing Appellant to proceed without counsel must be treated as a substantial 
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violation of Appellant's constitutional right to counsel. 
ARGUMENTS 
A. 
AFTER MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE. THE APPELLANT ASSERTS THAT 
THE SAME IS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT ON COUNT I, THEFT. A THIRD 
DEGREE FELONY. 
Where the issue on appeal deals with sufficiency of evidence, in determining 
whether a jury verdict should be set aside for insufficient evidence this Court has 
previously ruled in State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386 (Utah App. 1991) as follows: 
The evidence and the reasonable inferences which might be drawn 
therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. 
A jury conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime on which he was 
convicted. 
See also State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141-1147 (Utah 1989). This Court has also 
held in State v. Vessev. 967 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah App. 1998), that one challenging 
the verdict must marshal the evidence and then demonstrate that it is insufficient 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. The problem in the instant 
case is the same as that which was recognized in State v. Burton. 800 P.2d 817 
(Utah App. 1990) where one must consider the elements of theft in the context of a 
real estate sales contract. A person commits a theft if he obtains or exercises 
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unauthorized control of the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
As indicated in the instructions given to the jury, the deprivation must be more than 
temporary and in the instant case it is not clear exactly who was deprived or what. 
One inference is that theft was committed against the Granillos. However, it could 
not be reasonably inferred that they were deprived of property since they took 
possession of the property at the time of executing the contract which went 
uncontroverted at the time of trial. Of course, their purchase of the property was 
dependent upon their payments and therefore it could not be said that the Appellant 
committed theft against them by selling them the property and receiving payment 
thereon. Another possible inference could be that Porter was the person over whom 
was exercised the unauthorized control of his property with the purpose to deprive 
thereof. It is true that Porter gave the Appellant eight thousand five hundred dollars 
($8,500.00) and was ultimately paid more than that which was set forth in the 
assignment. In other words, Porter appears to have benefitted beyond the terms of 
his agreement and therefore it is difficult to see how theft was committed against 
him. One inference might be that he was also entitled to the payments during the 
term of the collateral assignment. However, the testimony is uncontroverted that his 
ultimate expectation was nine thousand three hundred fifty dollars ($9,350.00) as full 
complete payment under the assignment. See the trial transcript at pages 141-143 
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and 185-186. 
The only person that did not receive what he bargained for was the Appellant. 
However, it is not a reasonable inference to assume that an individual can exercise 
the unauthorized control over his own property and commit a theft against himself. 
Also, it should be noted that no one was deprived of their interest in the various 
arrangements. The parties either received what they bargained for or chose to 
pursue their interest no further by not abiding the terms of their agreement. As the 
Appellant noted at trial, the matter was civil in nature and did not rise to a level 
justifying criminal prosecution. 
B. 
AFTER MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE. THE APPELLANT ASSERTS THAT 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT ON COUNT II. FORGERY. A 
THIRD DEGREE FELONY. 
This Court has previously ruled in State v. Winward. 909 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 
1995) that the law does not conclusively presume that because a person signed the 
name of another a forgery has occurred. The act of signing another's name without 
permission does not constitute forgery unless it is done with the intent to defraud. 
To sustain a conviction of forgery there must be a sufficient connection between the 
act of forgery and the intent to defraud. Id. at page 912. See also Hendershott v. 
People. 653 P.2d 385, 390 (Colo. 1982). In order to subject a person to criminal 
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liability, there must be a concurrence of an unlawful act and a culpable mental state. 
The court further stated that even if the Defendant possesses both an intent to 
defraud and commits the act of signing another's name without authority, a forgery 
conviction cannot be sustained unless the act was done in furtherance of the 
intention. Stated another way, a defendant who has signed another's name without 
permission, while possessing an intent to defraud that is completely unrelated to the 
unauthorized signing, has not committed forgery. Id. at page 913. The essence of 
that limitation is found in the factual situation in State v. Winward. It is also found in 
the factual situation presented in the instant case where the forgery occurs involving 
collateral documentation and not the promise to pay or the assignment itself. The 
terms of the assignment allowed the assignee to receive other assurances including 
other contracts. As a demonstration of the Appellant's lack of intent to defraud, the 
Appellant offered to exchange the contract presumed by Porter to be deficient with 
the one executed by the Granillos. Porter refused the collateral. He did so because 
he was not interested in the property but only to be repaid. He ultimately was paid 
beyond the terms of the assignment in essence receiving more than what he 
bargained for. It is true that the Appellant altered an agreement which he used to 
support his promise to repay his obligation. It is also true that he was not able to pay 
the obligation at the time it became due. It could also be reasonably inferred that 
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had the third party, Mr. Comstock, not purchased the contract, then Porter may have 
suffered a loss. However, to acknowledge such inferences as evidence of fraud 
would be to ignore the very facts of the case since the parties either received the 
benefit of their bargain or more, excluding the Appellant. However, like set forth 
above, it is not reasonable to infer that a proper reading of the language would allow 
for a fraudulent act against one's self as the basis for the charge. There simply is 
no clear victim. Moreover, there is not class of victims involved in this matter. The 
charge of forgery does not work because there was simply no showing of a specific 
intent to defraud. Moreover, it would be difficult to make a case of fraud on the civil 
side of the action. To bring a fraud claim, a party must allege that a representation 
was made concerning presently existing material facts which were false and which 
the representer either knew false or made recklessly knowing that there was 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base such representation for the purpose of 
inducing another to act upon it and the other party, acting reasonably and in 
ignorance of its falsity, did in fact rely upon it and was thereby induced to act to the 
parties' injury and damage. While it is true that the document presented by 
Appellant was an altered form of the real estate sales transaction involving Granillos, 
the contract involving the Granillos was in fact a valid contract. Moreover, the 
Appellant acted in a way to provide additional assurance when the collateral was 
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called into question. Last, a fraud claim cannot be made out unless a party is in fact 
injured or sustains damage. 
Consequently, even civil prosecution under the facts and circumstances of the 
instant case would have to fail in light of the fact that Porter received more than he 
bargained for under the terms of their agreement. 
C. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO 
IRRELEVANT AND PREJUDICIAL TESTIMONY AND DID NOT ADEQUATELY 
INSTRUCT THE JURY. 
Our direct examination of Porter during the case in chief of the State, the 
question was asked how the Appellant responded to a question from Porter about 
notifying the county attorney's office. Counsel for Appellant objected. After a 
discussion at side bar which included the witness, the court overruled the objection 
and allowed the question which more or less opened the door to making mention of 
prior criminal acts of the Appellant. See the trial transcript at page 137 . Since the 
matter involved Appellant's reaction to Porter's question long after the execution of 
the assignment, the question of relevancy and its probative value seems to have 
been one that should have been considered by the court. Although, it is not clear 
from the discussion during side bar, it seems clear from the comments made by the 
court thereafter as way of explanation, see the trial transcript at page 155-59, that 
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the court did not consider the matter in the context of Rule 401 as applied to Rules 
403 and 404 where it might involve prior bad acts. Moreover, it does not seem to 
have been allowed for the purpose of proving motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. The 
court's response suggests state of mind which might mean intent but it is not clear 
just how that would apply. The Appellant's response to Porter's question about law 
enforcement in contemplating whether the Appellant intended to deceive when 
preparing the document some months prior seems a bit of a stretch. However, 
evidence of prior crimes is presumed prejudicial and absent a valid reason for 
admission of evidence other than to indicate a criminal disposition, the evidence 
should be excluded. See State v. Sanders. 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985). 
Evidence is not admissible if the purpose is to disgrace the defendant as a person 
of evil character with a propensity to commit crime and thus likely to have committed 
the crime charged. However, if evidence has relevancy to explain circumstances 
surrounding the instant crime, it is admissible for that purpose and that fact it may 
tend to connect a defendant with another crime will not render it incompetent. See 
State v.Daniels. 584 P.2d 880,882 (Utah 1978). In State v. Smith. 700 P.2d 1106, 
(Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court held that when relevant evidence is admissible 
for one purpose and inadmissible for another purpose, the trial judge upon request 
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shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly. 
Therefore, it is error not to give a limiting or cautionary instruction. Where the 
purpose of the instruction is clear in the context of the trial, as well as the content of 
the court's instructions to the jury generally, failure to include a special limiting 
instruction will not constitute prejudice or error. However, there does not appear any 
such clear indication of content or context in the present case. There does not 
appear to have been a specific request made as a matter of record and therefore the 
same may have been waived or at least the inference can reasonably be made 
accordingly. 
The Appellant further believes that the instruction given regarding forgery was 
not sufficient in light of State v. Winward. Appellant contends that the jury should 
have been instructed more specifically of the connection between the act of forgery 
and the intent to defraud; particularly, instructing them that one who signs the name 
of another without permission while possessing intent to defraud completely 
unrelated to the unauthorized signing has not committed forgery. In light of the 
inadequacy, the Appellant believes that the trial erred in its ruling and instruction. 
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D. 
THE TRIAL ERRED IN REQUIRING APPELLANT TO GO FORWARD WITH 
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING WITHOUT REPRESENTATION AND THE 
STATE'S OBJECTION TO APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR CONTINUANCE AS 
WELL AS LOOSE AND PREJUDICIAL CHARACTERIZATION OF THE 
EVIDENCE AT TRIAL CONSTITUTED IS SUFFICIENT TO FIND 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT. 
The Appellant contends that the preliminary hearing is a critical part of the 
proceedings and therefore is entitled to legal representation. The Appellant 
requested a continuance for the purpose of securing representation of his choice to 
be present for the preliminary hearing. It was the first request made by the 
Appellant. The same was denied upon the objection made by the State. Rule 3.8, 
of the Rules of Professional conduct applies to prosecutors and in criminal cases 
states that the prosecutor shall make reasonable efforts to assure the accused has 
been advised of his right to and the procedure for obtaining counsel and has been 
given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel. The basis for the objection was 
given in the context of the inconvenience to witnesses which were traveling from Las 
Vegas, Nevada, a distance of one hundred seventy (170) miles more or less. There 
just did not seem to be any reason at this time in the proceedings to insist upon 
going forward with the preliminary hearing without Appellant having the assistance 
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of counsel. In State v. Jimenez, 588 P.2d 707, (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated clearly that county attorneys where constitutional officers and empowered to 
perform such duties as may be prescribed by the law. More recently, in State v. 
Hav. 859 P.2d 1 (1993), the Utah Supreme Court stated that the prosecution's 
responsibility is that of a minister of justice and not simply to advocate, which 
includes the duty to see that a defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt 
is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. Denying the motion to continue, 
effectively denying Appellant of his right to counsel of choice, a fundamental and 
constitutional right can not be considered in any light other than an error of 
substantial and prejudicial impact. In light of the same consideration, it is also noted 
that throughout the trial, reference was made by the prosecutor to at least one of the 
documents created by Appellant as being a "bogus" contract, see trial transcript 
pages 151,153. Counsel for Appellant objected and the objections were sustained. 
Notwithstanding, the mischaracterization in the form of the prosecuting questions 
may have had a prejudicial impact upon the jury which is inconsistent with the duty 
set forth in State v. Hav. to insure that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient 
evidence not predisposing the issue by reckless miccharacterization. Consequently, 
the Appellant asserts that the verdict should be reversed in that the evidence is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
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entertained a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed the crimes of which he was 
convicted. 
CONCLUSION 
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, Appellant, DEWEY BUD 
CAMMACK, prays that relief be granted in reversing the trial court's ruling, 
remanding for new trial or for such other and further relief as to this Court appears 
appropriate and proper 
DATED this /U day of U/[(^KJ 20^) . 
J. BRY^iJACKSON, 
Attorney for Appellant Cammack 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the c^C^ day of /{CwWwfot/ . 20<£3 .1 did 
mailed a true and correct photocopy of the BRIEF OF APPELLANT CAMMACK, by 
way of U.S. mail, postage fully prepaid, thereon, to the following: 
SCOTT GARRETT 
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COURT OF APPEALS 
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Exhibit A 
Judgment and Sentence 
DAVID EJDOXEY (#7506) 
Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney 
Wain, Suite #1 97 North 
P.O. Box 
Cedar CM 
Telephone! 
Telecopier 
^ 0 
428 
, Utah 84720 
t (435)586-6694 
I: (435) 586-2737 
23 ?003 
^ C / < 9rk 
IN [THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEWEY 
10/13/45 
B. CAMMACK, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, STAY OF 
EXECUTION OF SENTENCE, ORlJ)ER 
OF PROBATION, and COMMITMENT 
Criminal No.011500845 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
The Defendant, DEWEY B. CAMMACK, having been found guilty by a jury trial of 
Theft, a Tnird-Degree Felony, and Forgery, a Third-Degree Felony on June 8,2002, andjthe 
above-entitled matter having been called on for sentencing on November 4,2002, in Parc|wan, 
Utah, and {he above-named Defendant, DEWEY B. CAMMACK, having appeared beforp the 
Court in parson together with his attorney of record, Mike Esplin, and the State of Utah bjaving 
appeared by and through Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney David E. Doxey, and the Court 
having reviewed the sentencing recommendation and having further reviewed the file in |detail 
and thereaner,ha'ving heard statements from the Defendant, his attorney, and the Chief Deputy 
Iron Counw Attorney, and the Court being fully advised in the premises now makes and fnters 
the following Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation, add 
Commitmelnt, to wit: 
JUDGMENT 
IT 
DEWEY 
Third 
regard to 
shown or 
convicted 
B 
Degre 
w 
S HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, 
CAMMACK, has been convicted of Theft , a Third-Degree Felony, and Forgery, a 
e Felony, and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had anything to say in 
hy judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being 
Appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged an<jl 
IT 
to his con\] 
(0-5) yeaq 
IT 
IT 
surcharge 
SENTENCE 
S HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, DEWEY B. CAMMACK, and pursuant 
iction of Theft, a Third-Degree Felony, is hereby sentenced to a term of zero tjo five 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
S FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, DEWEY B. CAMMACK, pay a fine in 
the sum aijd amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000), plus an eighty-five percent (85%) 
surcharge,! for his conviction of the offense. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, DEWEY B. CAMMACK, and pursuant 
to his conviction of Forgery , a Third-Degree Felony, is hereby sentenced to a term of zefo to five 
(0-5) years years in the Utah State Prison. 
IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, DEWEY B. CAMMACK, pay |a fine in 
the sum and amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000), plus an eighty-five percent (85%)| 
for his conviction of the offense. 
STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE 
ITIIS HEREBY ORDERED that the execution of the terms of imprisonment imp|osed and 
the fines ilnposed in this case are hereby stayed, pending the Defendant's strict adherence to and 
complianqe with the following terms and conditions of probation. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
IT|IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, 
DEWEY t*. CAMMACK is hereby placed on supervised probation for a period of thirty-six (36) 
months, td strictly comply with the following terms, provisions, and conditions: 
1. The Defendant shall forthwith make and execute a formal agreement provided by 
the Utah department of Adult Probation and Parole, and during the period of probation spt forth 
herein, shdll strictly conform with all the terms, provisions, and conditions, and the same, are 
hereby mafcle a part of this Order by means of incorporation. 
2. That the Defendant shall report as ordered and required by the Court and t|he 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole during the period of this probation. 
3. That the Defendant shall commit no law violations during the period of thlis 
probation. 
4. That the Defendant shall serve a term of incarceration in the Iron County Jail for a 
period of dne year. The Defendant is granted the privilege of work release on the terms $nd 
condition$|as set forth by the jail. 
5. That the Defendant shall make substantial payments towards his restitutio^ in this 
case and hi his previous cases. 
6. That the Defendant shall pay restitution in all of his cases. In this matter, |a 
restitution Rearing shall be set to determine the full amount of restitution. 
7. That the Defendant shall maintain full-time employment. The Defendants 
employment shall not involve the buying and selling of real estate. The Defendant may, 
however, £ell his own property through a real estate agent or an attorney. 
8. That the Defendant shall report to the County Attorney's Office all real estate 
deals befcfre the transfer. Said notice shall be given by letter at least fifteen (15) days prior to the 
transfer oi* property. 
9. That the Defendant shall report as ordered by the Court for review, <*^ C ^ * * ^ ^ > 
A/W3<>A*<. „,„ COMMITMENT / 
TO THE $HERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH: 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, DEWEY B. CAMMACK, 
and deliver him to the Iron County Jail in Cedar City, Utah, there to be kept and confined in 
accordande with the above and foregoing Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentience, 
Order of Probation, and Commitment. 
DATED t h i s ^ ^ d a y of January, 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
^ ~<r*<j&f~ 
J. Bnilip Eves 
fistrict Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE 
STATE (|>F UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF IRON ) 
I, (CAROLYN BULLOCH, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iifon 
County, State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and exact copy of jhe 
original Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation, and 
Commitment in the case entitled State of Utah vs. DEWEY B. CAMMACK. Criminal 
No.0115(Jl0845, now on file and of record in my office. 
WBTNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of 
Utah, this dy\ day of January, 2003. 
CAROLYN BULLOCH 
( S ^ A L ) 
CAROLYN BULLOCH 
District Court Clerk 
DeputyDistnct Court Clerk 
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Exhibit C 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT- CEDAR COURT 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE pF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEWEY fcUD CAMMACK, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
PRELIMINARY HEARING 
NOTICE 
Case No: 011500845 FS 
Judge: J. PHILIP EVES 
Date: November 19, 2Q01 
PRESENF 
Clerk: 
Prosec 
De 
maxmem 
Utor: PAUL A BITTMENN 
ifendant 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
birth: October 13, 1945 Date o 
Video 
Tape N 
CHARGE 
1 . THE 
2 . FOR 
HEARIN 
l imber: 2001-106 Tape Count: 1:57pm 
FT - 2nd Degree Felony 
GERY - 3rd Degree Felony 
This 
De 
is 
repres 
Mr 
Bitt 
The 
prelim 
Mr. 6' 
opening 
TIMr 
direct 
ifendant 
present 
and on 
endant 
ase comes before the court for a preliminary hearinb 
's Motion to Continue Preliminary Hearing. The djef 
without counsel. Paul A. Bittmenn is present 
fenting the State. 
Cammack argues in support of his Motion to Continue. Mr 
mem> argues in opposition to the Motion. Mr. Cammack pre 
t denies the Motion to Continue and will proceed |wi 
[Lnary hearing today. 
pLttmenn makes an opening statement. Mr. Cammack waitves his 
statement. 
pi: 2:02 PM Ramona-Gramillo is sworn and testifies unjder the 
examination of Mr. Bittmenn. State's Exhibits 1, 31, 4, and 
sponds, 
th the 
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Case NO: 011500845 
Date: Nov 19, 2001 
5 are received by the court. The court questions Mrs. Gramillo. 
Cross-examination by Mr. Cammack. 
TIME: 2:14 PM Antonio Gramillo is sworn and testifies under the 
direct examination of Mr. Bittmenn. Cross-examination by Mr. 
Cammack. Redirect examination by Mr. Bittmenn. 
Recrosp-examination by Mr. Cammack. The court questions Mr. 
GramilfLo. 
TIME: 2:27 PM Terry Porter is sworn and testifies under the 
direct 
Cammac 
examination of Mr. Bittmenn. 
k. Redirect examination by Mr, 
Cross-examination by Mr. 
Bittmenn. The court questions 
Mr. Porter. 
TIME: 2:44 PM Tom Comstock is sworn and testifies under the 
direct examination of Mr. Bittmenn. Cross-examination by Mr. 
Cammack. 
Court) takes a brief recess at 3:00 p.m. 
TIME: 3:13 PM Court reconvenes. All parties are present and 
ready to proceed. Mr. Comstock resumes the witness stand and 
continues to testify under the cross-examination of Mr. Cammack. 
The court questions Mr. Comstock. 
TIME: 3:26 PM Detective Mark Gower is sworn and testifies under 
the direct examination of Mr. Bittmenn. State's Exhibits 2 and 6 
are received by the court, 
The Spate rests at 3:31 p.m. The defense has no evidence, 
Mr. Bittmenn presents his closing arguments. Mr. Cammack presents 
his closing arguments. Rebuttal by Mr. Bittmenn, 
The court finds the evidence is sufficient to provide probable 
cause J and the defendant is bound over to the District Court on 
both charges in the Information, 
At the request of Mr, 
2001, kt 10:30 a.m. 
All exhibits are returned to Mr. Bittmenn, 
ARRAIGNMENT is scheduled. 
Dkte: 12/10/2001 
Tp.me: 10:30 a.m. 
Location: DISTRICT COURT 
IRON COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
68 SOUTH 100 EAST 
PAROWAN, UT 84761 
J. PHILIP EVES 
Cammack, arraignment is set for December 10, 
Before Judge 
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Exhibit B 
Uniform Real Estate Contract 
November 10th, 2000 
WHEN tepORDED MAILTO: 
between D. 
84721 and 
2. 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
Parties. This contract entered into this 10th day of N OV , 20 00 , is by and 
|L Cammack (hereafter called the seller), whose address is P.O Box 1563 Cedar City, Utah 
ANTONIO T.GRANILLO and RAMONA GRANILLO 
(hereafter called the Buyer) whose address is: 
(5019 HAYSTACK DRIVE LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89122-6845 
Property. Seller agrees to sell and Buyer agrees to buy the real property located in Iron 
County, St^e of Utah, described as: (SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT "A") 
Date of Possession. Seller agrees to deliver possession and Buyer agrees to enter 
into possession of the property on the day of 10TH ,20 00 
00 
4 
$ 35,000. 
$ 1,000.00| 
being paid 
until paid inl 
to the principal 
Price and Payment. Buyer agrees to pay for the property the purchase price of 
payable at sellers address given above, or to the Sellers order, on the following terms 
down payment, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of $ 34,000.00 
|as follows: $334.73 per month beginning December 10th,2000 and continuing monthly 
full, there is no penalty for early or pre-payment. All additional amounts paid shall apply directly 
Payments shall include interest at the rate of 9 % per annum on the unpaid balance 
from the ddte of 11/10/00 . Any payment not made within 15 days its due date shall subject Buyer to a 
late payment charge of 16% of such overdue payment, which charge must be paid before receiving credit 
for the late payment. 
All payments made by the Buyer shall be applied first to payment of late charges, next to Seller 
due amount with interest as provided herein. Buyer may, at Buyer's option, pay amounts in excess of the 
periodic payments herein provided, and such excess payments shall be applied to unpaid principal. 
There shallfat no time be a penalty for excess or early payment. 
5. No Waiver. If Seller accepts payments from Buyer in any amount less than or at a time later 
than hereirj provided, such payment will not constitute a modification of Seller's contract. 
Underlying Obligations. Seller warrants that the only underlying obligation against th 
property is an obligation ion favor of McGARRY for the amount of frljfllBSSO tfe & *?& ° 2 -
and that Seller will have this balance paid in full on or prior to Buyer paying off this contract. 
7. Covenant Against Liens. Except for the lien and encumbrance listed in the preceding 
section, Seller covenants to keep the property free and clear of all liens and encumbrances. So long as 
Buyer is current hereunder, Seller agreed to keep currant the payments and obligations to which the 
Buyer's interest is subordinate. 
8. Risk of Loss. Prorations. All risk of loss, destruction of the property, and expenses of 
insurances shall be borne by Seller until the agreed date of possession, at which time property taxes, 
assessments, rents, insurance and other expenses of the property shall be prorated. 
9. Taxes and Assessments. Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments which 
become dtie on the property during the life of this contract. 
0 0 4 3 4 7 6 9 BK00752 PG00521-00523 
PATSY CUTLER - IR0H COUNTY RECORDER 
2001 MAY 31 15:34 P« FEE $14.00 BY DBJ 
REQUEST: CEDAR LAND TITLE INC 
1 0 
payment o] 
any such 
amount. o« 
this contra 
Seller's Option to Discharge Obligations. In the event Buyer shall default in the 
any taxes, assessments, or other expenses of the property, the Seller may, at his option pay 
efmounts and thereafter charge the Buyer 1 1/2% interest per month for any such outstanding 
Seller may refuse to convey Title to the property if such amounts are outstanding at the end of 
t. 
16 
18 
11L No Waste. Buyer agrees that Buyer will neither commit or suffer to be committed any 
waste, spqil, or destruction in or upon the property which would impair Seller's security. 
12j. Arbitration. The Buyer and Seller intend to avoid major differences among themselves in 
the conduct if this contract. The parties intend that the contract terms shall control the parties rights and 
obligations herein. But as to matters of unresolved disagreement the Buyer and Seller agree to submit 
their differences to determination and award to the American Arbitration Association, with arbitration to be 
conducted in the State of Utah. 
13. Binding Effect. This contract is binding of heirs, executors, administrators, personal 
representatives, successors and assigns the respective parties hereto. 
14. Buyer's Default. Should Buyer fail to comply with the terms hereof, Seller shall give 
Buyer written notice specifically setting forth the provision under which Buyer is at default. If such default 
is then not|corrected Seller may select any single remedy to reclaim the property. 
1Sl. Buyers Covenant Against Liens. The Buyer shall at no time during the course of this 
contract, a low, or cause to be allowed encumbrance against the property, and shall assume full liability for 
any such lien or encumbrance against Buyer. 
Time of Essence. It is expressly agreed that time is of essence in this contract. 
Entire Agreement. This contract contains the entire agreement between the parties 
hereto. Arty provisions hereof not enforceable under the laws of the State of Utah shall not affect the 
validity of iny other provisions hereof. 
Other Provisions. 
written. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have set their signature on the day and year first above 
t wtw^/^.jueAL**^^ 
Date 
Date 
0 0 4 3 4 7 6 9 BK00752 Pe00522 
ss. 
COUNTYORReN C J — - * ~ 
Onthe "vs*-^ day of -&>—__w-%- ,20o o .personally appeared before me ANTONIO AND RAMONA 
GRANILLO , the Buyer and signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they 
executed the same. 
("Buter. ANTONIO X G R A N I L I O N K 
Buyer RAMONA GRANILLO 
STATE OF OTAH ^ « ~ o ~ ^ _ 
Commission Expires: 
\ o o ^ 
NOTORY PUBLIC 
• * * a t i — - -
 f fc^. 
, JO ANNA CASTILLO , 
|N0TARY PUBLIC STATE OF NEVADA! 
COMMISSION NO. 00-61833-1 
Comm. Expires March 24 onnd 
EXHIBIT "A" 
ATTACHMENT TO ANTONIO & RAMONA GRANILLO 
CONTR <VCT 
ALL OF THE NORTH HALF OF THE NORTH HALF OF SECTION 1, 
TOWNSHIP 34 SOUTH, RANGE 17 WEST, SALT LAKE BASE AND 
MERIDIAN. EXCLUDING THEREFROM THAT PORTION LYING 
WITHIN THE EXISTING RAILROAD RIGHT OF WAY. 
INGRESS AND EGRESS ACCESS GRANTED VIA A MAINTAINED 
ROAD ALONG SAID RIGHT OF WAY. POWER AND TELEPHONE LINE 
ARE ALSO WITHIN THE SAID RIGHT OF WAY. 
0 0 4 3 4 7 6 9 BK00752 PG00523 
Exhibit C 
Uniform Real Estate Contract 
November 11th, 2000 
WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO: 
1. 
between D 
84721 and 
2. 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
Parties. This contract entered into this 11th day of N O V , 20 00 , is-by and 
[L. Cammack (hereafter called the seller), whose address is P.O Box 1563 Cedar City, Utah 
ANTONIO T.GRANILLO and RAMONA GRANILLO 
(hereafter called the Buyer) whose address is: 
15019 HATSTACK DRIVE, LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89122-6845 
do 
4 
$ 35,000. 
$ 1,000.0(^ 
being paid 
Property. Seller agrees to sell and Buyer agrees to buy the real property located in Iron 
County, St^teof Utah, described as: 
(SEE ATTACHMENT A) 
Date of Possession. 
into possession of the property on the 
Seller agrees to deliver possession and Buyer agrees to enter 
11TH day of NOVEMBER ,20 00 
Price and Payment. Buyer agrees to pay for the property the purchase price of 
payable at sellers address given above, or to the Sellers order, on the following terms 
down payment, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and teh balance of $ 
las follows: 
$304.90 PER MONTH BEGINNING JANUARY 11, 2000 AND CONTINUING 
MONTHLY UNTIL PAID IN FULL 
Payments shall include interest at the rate of 9 % per annum on the unpaid balance from the 
date of 11/11/00 . Any payment not made within 15 days its due date shall subject Buyer to a late 
payment charge of 16% of such overdue payment, which charge must be paid before receiving credit for 
the late payment. 
AHpayments made by the Buyer shall be applied first to payment of late charges, next to Seller 
due amount with interest as provided herein. Buyer may, at Buyer's option, pay amounts in excess of the 
periodic payments herein provided, and such excess payments shall be applied to unpaid principal. 
There shall at no time be a penalty for excess or early payment. 
5. No Waiver. If Seller accepts payments from Buyer in any amount less than or at a time later 
than herein provided, such payment will not constitute a modification of Seller's contract. 
6. Underlying Obligations. Seller warrants that the only underlying obligation against the 
property is an obligation ion favor of McGARRY for the amount of $2,122.00 
and that Seller will have this balance paid in full on or prior to Buyer paying off this contract. 
7. Covenant Against Liens. Except for the lien and encumbrance listed in the preceding 
section, Seller covenants to keep the property free and clear of all liens and encumbrances. So long as 
Buyer is current hereunder, Seller agreed to keep currant the payments and obligations to which the 
Buyer's interest is subordinate. 
8. Risk of Loss. Prorations. All risk of loss, destruction of the property , and ej 
insurances shall be borne by Seller until the agreed date of possession, at which time proper! 
assessments, rents, insurance and other expenses of the property shall be prorated. 
9. Taxes and Assessments. Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments which 
D U 4 3 " j j 4. BKOO/47 '£•00 12I 
becjome due 01 the property during the life of this contract. 
10. Seller's Option to Discharge Obligations. In the event Buyer shall default in the 
payjTient of any taxes, assessments, or other expenses of the property, the Seller may, at his option pay 
any such amounts and thereafter charge the Buyer 1 1/2% interest per month for any such outstanding 
amount. Seller may refuse to convey Title to the property if such amounts are outstanding at the end of 
this 
waai 
the 
11. No Waste. Buyer agrees that Buyer will neither commit or suffer to be committed any 
|te, spoil, or destruction in or upon the property which would impair Seller's security. 
12. Arbitration. The Buyer and Seller intend to avoid major differences among themselves in 
:onduct if this contract. The parties intend that the contract terms shall control the parties rights and 
contract. 
obligations herein. But as to matters of unresolved disagreement the Buyer and Seller agree to submit 
their differences to determination and award to the American Arbitration Association, with arbitration to be 
conducted in the State of Utah. 
13. Binding Effect. This contract is binding of heirs, executors, administrators, personal 
representatives, successors and assigns the respective parties hereto. 
14. Buyer's Default. Should Buyer fail to comply with the terms hereof, Seller shall give 
Buyjer written notice specifically setting forth the provision under which Buyer is at default. If such default 
is thjen not corrected Seller may select any single remedy to reclaim the property. 
15. Buyers Covenant Against Liens. The Buyer shall at no time during the course of this 
contract, allow, or cause to be allowed encumbrance against the property, and shall assume full liability for 
anyjsuch lien or encumbrance against Buyer. 
16. Time of Essence. It is expressly agreed that time is of essence in this contract. 
17. Entire Agreement. This contract contains the entire agreement between the parlies 
hereto. Any provisions hereof not enforceable under the laws of the State of Utah shall not affect the 
validity of any other provisions hereof. 
18. Other Provisions. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have set their signature on the day and year first above 
written. 
i 
BIJYERS SIGNATURE / ^ X ^ / ^ ^ ^ r ^ # d a t e W ' S " ^ ^ 
SELLERS SIGNATURE ^ ^ ^ ^ g g ^ ^ V - r ^ ^ " " S ^ — ^ ///~5 
CAMMACK 
0 0 4-33 1.04- BK.00747 PGUOI; 
ATTACHMENT A 
(PARCEL NUMBER 10) ALL OF THE NORTH HALF OF 
SECTION 1, TOWNSHIP 34 SOUTH, RANGE 17 WEST, 
SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN. EXCEPTING 
THEREFROM THAT PORTION LYING WITHIN THE 
EXISTING RAILROAD RIGHT OF WAY. TOGETHER 
WITH AN ACCESS EASEMENT ALONG THE RAILROAD 
RIGHT OF WAY FOR INGRESS AND EGRESS TO SAID 
PROPERTY. 
Exhibit D 
Assignment of Contract 
December 21st, 2000 
h i R . i UMLtS - IRON COUNTY RECORDER 
200.1 APR 23 09 :04 AH FEE $18,00 BY OBJ 
REDDEST; FERRY PORTER 
ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT 
THIS AGREEMENT, made in the City of CEDAR CITY, STATE OF UTAH", on the 21st 
day of December, 2000 by and between DEWEY B. CAMMACK, P.O. BOX 1563, 
CEDAR CITY, UTAH 84721 herein after referred to as ASSIGNOR, and / V * y 
flot-is^ A&. •&*>* J V ^ - J * c~al~- ^«>Vherein after referred to as 
ASSIGNEE. / 
WITNESSETH 
WHEREAS, under the date of 11/11/2000, DEWEY B. CAMMACK, as seller entered 
into a Uniform Real Estate Contract with ANTONIO T. GRANILLO and RAMONA 
GRANILLO. (Said Contract and associated legal description attached hereto). 
ASSIGNOR herebys sells and ASSIGNEE hereby buys this contract for the agreed 
price of $8,500.00. ASSIGNOR agrees to buy back, and ASSIGNEE agrees to sell 
this contract at the price of $9,350.00 on or before February 20, 2001. Should 
ASSIGNOR defauti in buying this contract back as agreed, said assignor shall forfiet 
all right and title in and to the contract and the accompaning land, as described. 
During the term of this ASSIGNMENT the ASSIGNEE will collect the payments as 
described in the contract. 
NOW THEREFORE, it is mutually understood that: 
1.) The consideration for this agreement shall be the $8,500.00. 
2.) That the Assignor has duly performed all conditions of said contract. 
3.) That the contract is now in full force and the unpaid balance is $34,000.00. 
4.) That Assignor and Assignee will duly keep and observe all of the terms 
and conditions of said contract. 
5.) that the Assignor personally gurantees this contract, and if default occurs by 
buyer GRANILLO, Assignor will replace this contract with one of equal value. 
ASSIGNOR date ASSIGNEE ' d a t e " 
K_^MJL6?f^00l 
-****- Notary PubHc & 
Doris R. Goodwin 
186 North Main St. 
Ctdar City, Utah 84720 
My Committor* Expires 
4-15-2004 . 
tf ^m**- Stat* of Utah -
O O 4 ^ 3 1 0 4 BK.00747 P&0011? 
Exhibit E 
Excerpts from Trial Transcripts 
1 Q, And then after that, secpndly, you had contact 
2 by Mr, Porter; correct? 
3 A* That's correct. 
4 Q. And he said he was trying to get rid of the 
5 contract; is that right? He didn't want this contract, 
6 he wanted to see if he could sell it at a discount or 
7 whatever; is that correct? 
8 A. Well, he said if it was — he said, "It's not 
9 performing, so yes, I want to sell it. I want to get 
10 rid of it." 
11 Q. Okay, so he wanted to get rid of it; right? 
12 A. Right. 
13 Q. Fair to say? 
14 A, He wanted his money, is what he wanted. 
15 Q. He wanted his money. 
16 A. Everybody wants money. 
17 Q. That's — well, that's what it's all about, 
18 isn't it? Yes. Okay. 
19 ! Now, isn't it true that after you had made the 
20 contacts with the Granillos and you had made the contact 
21 ' with Mr. Porter that you engineered — by "engineered" I 
22 | mean you were kind of the moving party here to arrange a 
23 transaction, which -- which all the parties took part to 
I : 
24 resolve this issue? 
I 
25 A. No. What I i n d i c a t e d t o Mr. P o r t e r was , I 
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s a i • * « »-vt ,'.,i-. ?. Lnexe ;> LWO c o n t r a c t 
f "anioiia o J i a n j M o e m p h a t i c a l l y i n d i c a t e s 
j n e d or.i h e r e v fci 6 x 11 L t n e jpayr-en 
was J J , 4 ; J c i^oi *»• - i . ^ r c o n t r a c t , f h e 
P o r t e r ' . ' f . 'H' . ract , , was for 6 L X j — L 
a rr I ' ii i-Hi * «;i I. p u r c i i d s i u y : h u but t h e r - ' 
I x s c r e p a n c y and u n t i l *-hn*" ' ° r e s o l " — 
C i i i a i * * ~> a b l -"* L o i e?( . 1 \re 
.iAe u x J c i e p a n c \ 
• - t r a c t , Fl A . 
L c o r r e c t ? 
A. Y e s . 
Q. 0 k a v . 
An-1 i ~r 
conclude-, b . . 
d v d x i u u o n L i a c t ; ^ i ! ! I. 
» +- r e s s e d u.i 
. r o r t e i JLI. obt.'iinin.i that c o n t r a c t 
p u r c h a s u - o t ?, -< j c o n t r a c t for --
f
 i tru° .- - r* * 
t- o n^ v v i .. | ,. . ii-. s urn of $ 15 , 0 0 0 for h i s u t e r e s ' 
t h a t f ^ n t r a c t ? 
i . , 1 1 « i i a r a s t h e t i t "i e f e e -
a n a L t i i n 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
g. J l i k ^ ' • r-
A ri rj V O U 
I a g r e e d 
o k a y . 
i 
L li a i 
! t? f e e s ? 
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A - J 5 ' v - •* •-* *•-"'' u l u i y J , v,
 v ~ ui.'j we 
t ±u a g a i n aau a g r e e d , b e c a u s e i p p a r ^ n H v ^ 
i! a m m a i* k h a t i o w»»rl h i w n ome j reed 1» 
11 x g 11 <j" i | ( i 1 i i " 1 I lie cuuid resolve a; i v.he diserepan: 
-- a x a you ultimately pay h i m 
V J_ w» f Kj \J V u t e r e s t ? 
A. T D a 
Q.. •» t t»T y o t e t j i l t 
A . i iici L 5 c o r r e c t . 
Q. (Inaudible) the iru-ury. y x^ i.* r 
LU the title compa n y a n d you pres u m e t h a i 
P orte r r e c ei v P d 11 ? 
A. T 'orrect. 
Q. Okay. 
I I uidt, dxv. .' •. -i :r M r . 
Cammack r -j<m i red M-> sign documents f , ;. •. < ^  : -• 
i nteres' 
A. Ye ,S , ho wa : 
0. i • : ^ do SO1? 
A. Y c ~
 f w n e x c e p t J -,%ii ire — 
i t } a * d o Turner* *- wiute something on 
jiufient a^ ^ . ^ cal 1 ih 
Inaudible^ 
• aqe n7 
regularly deal in real estate? 
A. Not on a regular basis but it is part of it, 
yes . 
Q. Okay, 
And you're familiar with how real estate 
contracts work? 
A. For the most part, yes. 
Q. Okay. 
And how long have you known Mr. Cammack? 
A. Twenty-five, thirty years. 
Q. Okay. 
Have you considered Mr. Cammack a friend? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you recall Mr. Cammack coming to you 
some time in November or December, I believe it was 
November, to -- with an offer to purchase an assignment 
on a real estate contract? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And after talking with him, did you 
(Inaudible) that assignment contract? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Okay. I show you what's been marked as 
State's Exhibit No. 6. Is that the document that you 
and Mr. Cammack signed? 
A. It is. 
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A, No. 
Q. Would you have given him $8,500 if you knew 
that you would not receive the cash (Inaudible)? 
A. No. 
Q. Now, as I understand it, you spoke with Mr. 
Cammack various times after you and Mr. Comstock put it 
together that your contract was no good; is that right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. About how many times would you say you spoke 
with Mr. Cammack? 
A. Oh, three to seven times. 
Q. Okay. 
At any time did Mr. Cammack approach you with 
the real contract? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And what did he want to do with the 
real contract? 
A. Exchange it for the one that I had. 
Q. Okay. What did you tell Mr. Cammack? 
A. I said that, "I'm not comfortable with this." 
I said, "I don't know — I don't even know what to do at 
this point." 
Q. Okay. Did you refuse to give him back the 
bogus contract? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Did Mr- Cammack acknowledge to you that the 
contract was bogus? 
A. No. He said, "I don't understand" -- he said, 
"I don't understand how you put — I don't understand 
what you've got here. Here's the contract." 
Q. Okay, and what did you say to him? 
A. I said, "That isn't the same contract that I 
have." 
Q. Okay. Did he say anything to that? 
A. I can't recall if there was anything to that. 
Q. Did Mr. Cammack ever ask you not to record 
your contract? 
A. To the best of my memory, there was a 
discussion on ~- I told him I was going to — this 
contract had to be recorded and I was going to get it 
recorded and he had asked that it — and I'm not clear 
on this one, I believe he had asked that I didn't record 
it. 
Q. Okay. He did ask you not to record it? 
A. I'm not clear on that. I don't know. 
Q. Okay. 
A. If you can see by the recording date, I think 
it was recorded quite a bit later, after the original — 
after it was assigned to me. It was recorded in April. 
Q. Did you confront Mr. Cammack about the 
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1 fraudulent nature of State's Exhibit No. 2? 
2 A. This one? 
3 Q. Yes. 
4 A. Yeah, I did. 
5 Q. And what did he say when you confronted him? 
6 A. That was at that point in that conversation 
7 when I said that this is not -- that the Granillos had 
8 indicated that they had not seen this contract and Mr. 
9 Comstock was I guess finding out about it. The 
10 Granillos were not aware of this contract, they had not 
11 seen it and they had produced a copy of the -- of the 
12 ' contract they had signed. Mr. Comstock had faxed a copy 
13 of that to me and obviously, it was not the same 
14 [ contract. It had different figures, it had different 
15 I dates. And I told Dewey, I said, "This is not the 
16 contract -- this is not -- this contract, as near as I 
17 , can tell, is not the real one." 
i 
18 Q. What did he say? 
19
 ; A. He said, "I don't understand because I have a 
20 contract right here," and he had another one in his hand 
21 and he said, "Here's the contract." And he says, "Why 
22 don't you give me that one." He says, "You don't" -- he 
23 says, "I'll give you this, you don't need that anymore." 
I 
24 ' And I says, "No, I think I better keep this 
i I 
25 . one." 
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Q. Okay, 
And why did you think you better keep it? 
A. My conscience just said that something was 
going on here and I don't know what I should be doing. 
Q. Okay. 
Did you ever encourage Mr. Cammack to go to 
the authorities to make -- clear it up? 
A. I did. 
MR. ESPLIN: I'm going to object to that, Your 
Honor, as relevance, what he (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Well, I sustain any further 
questions along those lines, unless you can show 
relevance. If you want to do that, approach the bench. 
MR. DOXEY: I can, Your Honor. 
(Whereupon, a side bar conference was held.) 
THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the 
objection. You can ask the question. 
MR. DOXEY: Thank you* 
Q. BY MR. DOXEY: When you encouraged Mr. Cammack 
to go to the authorities, what did he tell you? 
A. He said that he couldn't do that, he didn't 
feel like he could do that because the county attorney's 
office was — I can't remember the exact words, like 
they're out to get me, they have my number or, you know, 
like you know what they would do to me or something 
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along that line. 
Q. Okay. 
So in the end, did you rely on Mr. Cammack's 
-- when you were initially entering into the assignment 
contract, did you rely on Mr. Cammack's statements and 
his representations to give him $8,500? 
A. I did. 
Q. Did you rely on State's Exhibit No. 2, the 
bogus contract? 
A. I did. 
Q. Did you also rely on his representations made 
in the assignment of contract document? 
A. I did. 
Q. So did Mr. Cammack take money from you? 
A. He did. 
Q. And did he do that — or would he have been 
able to do that but for his misrepresentations to you? 
A. I would not have given him the money if I 
didn't have collateral to do so. 
Q. Now, the defense has made a point of bringing 
up how this whole thing got cleared up later, okay? Did 
you get the benefit of (Inaudible) out of this? 
A. To the best of my knowledge, I was returned 
basically what was interest into the contract, plus 
there was some additional monies that had to be cleared 
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Q, It was some time prior to that, wasn't it? 
A. Correct. 
Q. How long, would yoii sa^? 
A. A month. 
Q. Okay. 
So you think it was prior to maybe like 
December 5th or December 21st -- or excuse me, November 
21st or something like that, would it be? 
A. It could have been. 
Q. And at that point, did he express to you that 
he was -- that he had sold some property; is that 
correct? 
A. He expressed to me that he had a contract, he 
was in need of some money and was wanting to know if I'd 
be willing to advance him some money if he gave me the 
contract, but he was very adamant that he wanted to buy 
the contract back. 
Q. Okay. So it's fair to say that when he 
negotiated with you, he expected that what would happen, 
at least as far as he related to you, is that he would 
be able to pay the $9,350 on February — by February 
20th of 2001 and get that contract back? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And do you think that he was sincere in his — 
in that representation? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Do you think that at that point, when he -~ 
when you signed that agreement that he intended to -- to 
pay the $9,350 back to you (Inaudible)? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you think it was --
A. Or else I would not have entered into the 
contract. I --
Q. Did you believe at that point — 
A. -- don't know --
Q. — that — that -- that he was trying to cheat 
you out of anything? 
A. No. 
Q. And it's true, is it not, that as the time 
came, February 20, 2001, he was supposed to buy the 
contract back, that he contacted or you contacted him, 
there was a contact made from the two of you, do you 
remember who made the contact? 
A. I did. 
Q. Okay. And that's because you didn't want to 
keep the contract; right? 
A, Correct. 
Q. As well as — is it true also that as much as 
he wanted to buy the contract back, you didn't really 
care about the contract — to keep the contract, you 
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1 wanted the $9,350? 
2 A. Correct. 
3 Q. Now, when you made that contact with him, is 
4 it true that he indicated to you that he needed some 
5 more time, that he wasn't able to buy it back then? 
6 A. Correct. 
7 Q. Isn't it also true that he still advocated 
8 that he wanted to buy the contract back? 
9 A. That's correct. 
10 Q. In fact, at that time, didn't he, at some 
11 point then, offer titles to vehicles to you to secure 
12 your obligation? 
13 u A. Under the original assignment I was — I did 
14 not want the land where it was described to me, I've 
15 never seen the land, and I had asked that there be other 
16 collateral. And at that point, Mr. Cammack had agreed 
17 that he would put other collateral up in case I just --
18 in case he could not buy this contract back. 
19 Q. In fact, looking at Exhibit No. 6, the 
20 assignment of contract, you have that before you? 
21 A. Correct. 
22 Q. Isn't there a portion of that document that 
23 has some — contains some -- a portion of it is 
24 typewritten; correct? 
25 A. Uh-huh. 
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Q. You saw him sign thisrlojcay. 
And so on State's Exhibit No. 6, you can 
definitively tell the jury that that is Mr. Cammack's 
signature? 
A. It is . 
Q. When Mr. Cammack told you — and I think it 
would have been that he, quote, had a contract, okay, 
did you believe that it was a valid contract? 
A. Oh, yeah. 
Q. Okay. 
Mr. Porter, have you ever been strung along 
before? I think that's the common word. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. When you get strung along, just because 
you're getting strung along doesn't mean the person has 
good intentions to pay you back, does it? 
MR. ESPLIN: I object, (Inaudible) what his --
THE COURT: Sustained. I'm not even sure I 
understand what the question — 
MR. DOXEY: What strung long means? 
Q. BY MR. DOXEY: What does "strung along" mean 
to you, Mr. Porter? 
A. Payment hasn't come in on time, payment will 
be coming in the future, work with me, or you're in 
arrears and trying to get caught up. 
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Q. You can invest it (Inaudible); right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Is there time value of money associated with 
the $8,500 you gave Mr. Cammack? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you have — if Mr. Cammack would have 
come to you and said, "This is a bogus contract that I 
created," would you have given him the money knowing the 
time value of your money? 
MR. ESPLIN: Objection, Your Honor, this has 
been asked and answered on direct. He asked if he — 
THE COURT: That's correct. 
MR. DOXEY: I think the time value of money, 
though, is a different situation, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I'm not sure how that relates in 
this case. There hasn't been any discussion of what 
happened to the money or whether it changed in value. 
MR. DOXEY: All right. 
THE COURT: So I'll sustain the objection 
without further foundation. 
MR. DOXEY: All right. No further questions, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any — 
MR. ESPLIN: No further questions, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Questions by the jury? None. 
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defendant and his counsel and counsel for the State are 
present. 
I want to take advantage of this opportunity 
to make a record on the evidentiary ruling I made in the 
last session where I admitted certain comments that the 
defendant allegedly made to Mr* Porter over the 
objection of counsel, and that was the comment relating 
to his reluctance to go to authorities to clear up the 
situation because he felt that they had it in for him or 
they were out to get him or something along those lines. 
The reason I allowed it in is because I think 
it has relevance and the jury could accept it as 
evidence of Mr. Cammack's state of mind, his 
understanding that he might be guilty of a crime or 
might have committed a crime in his activities. If they 
take it that way, then they could use that to establish 
his mens rea at that time. 
On the other hand, it's an ambiguous statement 
and there may be other explanations for why it was made, 
but I don't think I can exclude it simply because the 
defendant may view it as having a different meaning. I 
think the jury gets to decide what meaning they want to 
ascribe to the comment, given all the circumstances in 
the case, and that's why I admitted it. 
Now, if there's nothing else --
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MR. ESPLIN: ' I 'juSt ne6d< a record on that, 
Your Honor, 
THE COURT: Go &hfcad. 
MR. ESPLIN: Well, first, my objection made at 
side bar was that I think the statement requires the 
defendant then to try and explain that statement and his 
explanation that would involve explaining that he is 
currently on probation. This may open the door for 
counsel to get in the reasons for that, which the Court 
has deemed inappropriate at this point and (Inaudible) 
stipulated that it is inappropriate. The --
THE COURT: Let me interrupt just to say, I've 
ordered that he's not to introduce that in his case in 
chief . 
MR. ESPLIN: Right. 
THE COURT: Now, if you're — if the defendant 
takes the stand and opens that door, he may get into it. 
MR. ESPLIN: That's why I'm objecting to the 
statement, because in order to explain that statement, 
he would -- his explanation that (Inaudible) that he has 
the probationary agreement which prohibits him from 
entering into any (Inaudible) legitimate contract 
i 
without notifying the county attorney's office. And so 
! his -- he will not be able to (Inaudible) jury without 
i 
opening that door for that -- that reason. It certainly 
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has nothing to do with the (Inaudible) concerned that 
somebody's out to bother (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Well, and I understand your 
concern, Mr. Esplin, and if I were in your situation, 
Ifd be just as concerned, but as I understand it, the 
defendant has two rights in this case. He has the right 
to remain silent and he has the right to take the 
witness stand and explain his version of the facts. I 
don't think he has the right to hide the ball from the 
jury and that's why I've allowed it in. 
MR. ESPLIN: We're (Inaudible) at least as to 
count -- the count concerning the contract itself, 
(Inaudible) based on the evidence here, clear back in 
December 21st, a (Inaudible) prior — somewhat prior to 
this statement being made. And he --
THE COURT: You've lost me, I'm sorry. 
MR. ESPLIN: Well, I'm talking about the 
actual allegations and testimony concerning when this 
contract was presented, both the contract that we're 
talking about here in terms of don't go to the 
authorities was presented, but then in December of the 
previous year and the — the comment at that time 
(Inaudible) may not have been anything other than a — 
to obtain the loan without him trying to (Inaudible) 
anybody any other thing you see. He tells them 
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(Inaudible) later on that his intent at that time was 
otherwise, so leaving the danger of a comment — the 
(Inaudible) value of the comment as being (Inaudible) 
effect of it. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't view it that way. 
If one — if one prepares a phony contract to obtain a 
loan and then when one can't pay back the loan one says 
to the lender, "I can't go to the authorities because 
they're going to prosecute me if I do," it seems to me 
that indicates that way back at the beginning, when that 
contract was prepared, he knew that he shouldn't be 
preparing that contract, and I think the jury can 
consider that. 
MR. ESPLIN: Thank you. 
THE COURT: So now, if there's nothing else, 
we'll invite the jury to rejoin us, and who's your next 
witness? 
MR. DOXEY: Patsy Cutler. 
THE COURT: Okay, and she's present? 
MR. DOXEY: Yes. 
THE COURT: Have a seat, folks. 
The record should reflect that all the members 
of the jury are back and in their places. 
We appreciate your patience. We took 
advantage of your absence from the courtroom to discuss 
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and he's in violation of his probation. And so the jury 
— the probative value of that is just so minuscule 
compared to the — the present issue that it will allow 
them to bring in the back door stuff they couldn't bring 
in different. In fact, there's been a previous 
conviction and there's been a probation. He's on 
probation, it's a violation of his probation agreement. 
MR. DOXEY: Well, let me address that, Your 
Honor. All we need to address is that there's an 
outstanding court order that Mr. Cammack report all 
financial trans — or real estate transactions to the 
county attorney's office. There is — we do not need to 
state that it's a criminal probation situation. All we 
need to know is that there's a court order that he do 
that and I think — I think we don't even need to get 
into the probation. 
THE WITNESS: I think I've done that. 
MR. DOXEY: He didn't need to get into the --
MR. ESPLIN: The jurors are not stupid, Your 
Honor. I mean — 
THE .GOURT,:,^Well; -.,-
MR. VJESPLI,R;iMf£bu know, when they talk about 
the county attbtney^tdWBBiitdce^ thev're going — and he's 
violated a court order, they're going to -- they're 
going to assume that he's, on other occasions, done 
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similar acts when the other occasion is (Inaudible) 
different situation. 
THE COURT: Let me ask this: What specific 
question do you propose to ask? 
MR. DOXEY: Why he didn't report this 
transaction to the county attorney's office as ordered 
by the court. 
THE COURT: And how would that bear on the 
issues in this case? 
MR. DOXEY: I think it shows his intent to 
hide the whole transaction, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Even assuming that that's true, 
how does that go to the elements of this case? 
MR. DOXEY: (Inaudible) his whole case, Your 
Honor. This is whole case --
THE COURT: Well, but even if this was a 
legitimate transaction, which he claims it was, which 
you claim it wasn't, he had an obligation to report it. 
MR. DOXEY: That's right, and he didn't. 
THE COURT: And that would violate his 
probation under your theory but it wouldn't make him 
guilty of this offense. 
THE WITNESS: I did report that. 
THE COURT: Mr. Cammack, this is a legal 
question, not for you to be involved. 
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THE WITNESS: Okay. 
THE COURT: You got a lawyer representing you. 
So I don't quite see the relevance of that 
line of inquiry. It may be that you want to charge him 
with violating his probation, if his probation --
MR. DOXEY: I don't — 
THE COURT: -- is Still in effect. 
MR. DOXEY: You know, I might do that later, 
Your Honor, but the reality is that's not why I'm 
offering it. I'm offering it to show his criminal 
intent, that he's hiding this whole transaction from our 
office. 
THE COURT: What criminal intent? Criminal 
intent to do what? 
MR. DOXEY: To defraud everybody in this -- to 
defraud Mr. Terry Porter, to defraud the Granillos. Why 
else would he hide it from us if it was a legitimate 
transaction? 
THE COURT: Well, I don't know why he would, 
but --
MR. DOXEY: There is no — 
THE COURT: -- the issue -- the point is, Mr. 
Doxey, that his failure to report it to the county 
attorney's office does not in any way demonstrate that 
the transaction was illegal. 
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MR. DOXEY: Iithink it does, Your Honor, 
THE COURT: Well, I' 11 disagree and I'm going 
to deny the request to ask that question. 
Now, are we done with that issue? Is there 
another issue we need to get to address? 
MR. DOXEY: (Inaudible) . 
THE COURT: Do you want to invite the jury 
back in. 
(Whereupon, the jury returns to the 
courtroom.) 
THE COURT: The jurors are back and in their 
places. That wasn't too long. 
Go ahead, Mr. Doxey, ask your next question. 
MR. DOXEY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Q. BY MR. DOXEY: Go to State's Exhibit No. 4. 
You prepared this whole document; is that correct? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Okay. You actually typed it out? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Okay. 
And as to State's Exhibit No. 6, did you type 
that out, too? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Except for the sentence on the bottom. 
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